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Abstract 
The  scope  of  the  paper  is  to  empirically  assess  whether  entrepreneurs  experiencing  difficulties  in  access‐to‐credit  are 
vulnerable to some forms of victimization, especially when this refers to crimes more related to entrepreneurs’ activity. The 
basic idea is that those entrepreneurs might be induced to fund themselves into the informal and criminal credit markets or, 
if  informationally  captured  by  a  bank,  can  be  exposed  to  requests  from  the  financial  intermediary  that might  also  have  a 
criminal  profile.  This  has  been  investigated  using  an  original  data  set with  information  collected  through  a  victimization 
survey administered  to  entrepreneurs  in Campania,  the  largest  region  in  the  South of  Italy. The  estimation  results  from a 
logistic equation are consistent with the hypothesis that, in presence of difficulties in accessing credit, the entrepreneur might 
incur in a higher risk of victimization.   
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The issue of repeated and multiple victimization has 
been addressed in the literature generally stressing the 
role of relational aspects, and in fact a contemporary 
prospect of victimology includes among others the 
contextual factors and those symbolic and cultural 
elements that contribute to originate an act of violence 
(Fattah 1992; Tilley and Laycock 2002, 2003; 
Townsley, Homel, and Chaseling 2003; Baldry 2003; 
Johnson, Bowers, and Pease 2004).  
The historical evolution of the concept of victim 
gave rise to a flourishing empirical literature, ranging 
from studies relating to the status of wife-beating in 
the 1980s (Steinmetz 1980; Straus 1983) to research 
on the abuse and mistreatment of the elderly (Solicitor 
General of Canada 1985; Bowland 1990) as well as to 
usury phenomenon involving pensioners and the 
elderly as victims (Stefanizzi 2002; Spina and 
Stefanizzi 2010), or the ill-treatment of children and 
young people (namely sexual abuse, mistreatment, 
child abuse, hazing as structure of institutional 
behaviour, bullying, etc.) (Depolo 2003; Ege 1997, 
2005; Hirigoyen 2000; Baldry 2006; Curci, Galeazzi, 
and Secchi 2003; Merzagora Betsos 2009; Ponzio 
2004; Ventimiglia 2002; Fonzi 1999; Genta 2002; 
Manesini 2003; Olweus 1996). More recent empirical 
research  emphasizes the unequal treatment of social 
control agencies, the persistence of ethnic prejudice, 
the relationship between migratory and crime 
processes (Palidda 1999; Ruggiero 2008; Melossi 
2008; McDonald 2009), and, finally, with a twist of 
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perspective of victimization and change in gender 
relations, the case of mistreated men (Struve 1990; 
Vezzadini 2004). 
Since any offence is a product of an interaction 
(between subjects and/or between subjects and the 
surrounding environment), the most recent assumption 
is that different social situations, such as 
socio-occupational positions, relational and interactive 
conditions, lifestyles or daily practices, increase the 
risk of victimization (Hindelang, Gottfredson, and 
Garofalo 1978).  
Although the analysis of social processes of 
victimization and causal mechanisms governing these 
processes has expanded its range of observation, still 
there is not any analytical framework that might 
consider certain social, professional, occupational 
conditions and the relationships between them and the 
environment, or the organizational structure with 
which the victim interacts. This is, for instance, the 
case of victimization risk of businessmen and the 
relation that this phenomenon has with 
access-to-credit.  
The analytical assumption discussed in this paper 
is that the difficulty of access-to-credit by the social 
category of entrepreneurs unfolds as a risk factor of 
victimization because it exposes them to loan shark 
credit, to criminal organizations and to various forms 
of intrusion into their business. However, this threat is 
differentiated, depending not only on banking policy 
strategies of credit companies rather on the quality of 
the relation which is intertwined between entrepreneur 
and Bank and on the use of the information available 
to the customer’s Bank.  
In the next paragraph a brief review of the 
literature on victims of business and white-collar 
crimes is presented, followed by a sociological 
perspective on the study of business victims, 
considering the case of a community of entrepreneurs 
based in Campania, the most important region in the 
South of Italy, and their experience in the 
access-to-credit. Then, on the basis of the relationship 
banking literature, it is argued that when a firm is 
informationally captured by a bank, it might observe a 
deterioration in its credit conditions and can also be 
exposed to requests from the financial intermediary 
that might also have a criminal profile. In the fifth 
paragraph, by using an original dataset collected 
administering a survey to entrepreneurs in Campania, 
a measure of the relationship between victimization 
and access-to-credit conditions is provided. Finally, 
the sixth paragraph concludes the paper.  
“INVISIBLE” CRIMES AND THE RATE OF 
VICTIMIZATION 
In the victimization literature a special consideration 
has to be reserved to those studies analyzing the 
victims of business or the victims of white-collar 
crimes, and more generally of the so-called “invisible” 
crimes. As a matter of fact, these sets of offences, 
because of proper characteristics (e.g., randomness of 
harm; the victim’s undefinability; widespread 
victimization; technical complexity of the committed 
crime) or environmental characteristics (prejudice 
against the complainant; transnationality; greater 
informal control; type of relationship between victim 
and perpetrator), escape social control agencies, or 
receive an evanescent social reaction, or are even 
downgraded in public opinion to the offences of a 
criminal elite considered dishonest but not criminal 
(Jupp 2001; Vidoni Guidoni 2006).  
First, research on corporate crime victimization 
was primarily focused on crimes resulting directly 
from business activities, such as environmental crimes, 
fraud to consumers, corruption, economic and fiscal 
fraud or computer thefts. For these crimes, it is the 
company that strategically acts in order to gain a 
direct or indirect advantage (corporate offences). 
Since its origin, this literature has interacted with the 
research on white-collar crimes: victims are generally 
“collective” and sometimes indefinite, and spatiality 
and temporality is asymmetric and asynchronous, 
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since crime occurs at a different time and place 
respect to when it produces effects.  
Another strand of literature investigates offences 
that are committed within the business activity. In this 
case, a company might be the offender, when crimes 
concern the non-compliance with rules on safety or 
health at work, or the victim, as with shoplifting or 
extortion. Furthermore, an enterprise is considered as 
the organizational model par excellence in which the 
hierarchical structure of working relations promotes a 
series of relational offences and power abuse (Vidoni 
Guidoni 2006; Bandini et al. 2004; Croall 2001a). 
Quite absent are the contributions that consider the 
effects of credit restrictions on entrepreneurs’ 
victimization as well as the relationship between 
access-to-credit difficulties and exposure to risk of 
infiltration of organized crime in the management of 
the enterprise (Savona 2009).  
Unfortunately, this kind of literature 
underestimates the actual volume of the committed 
offences, the reason being difficulties in obtaining 
data and precise information and identifying a clear 
cut cause-and-effect relationship between 
victimization and crime, the lack of cooperation on the 
part of firms and a poor quality of official statistics on 
these crimes that has been only recently improving. 
More harmful, however, is the widespread social 
consideration that leads to the decriminalization of 
such offences and behaviors, so as to render those 
crimes invisible or even not punished (Croall 2001b). 
THE SOCIOLOGICAL RELATIONAL 
APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF A 
BUSINESS VICTIM: THE CASE OF A 
COMMUNITY OF ENTREPRENEURS IN 
CAMPANIA 
Sociological research on this specific topic has not 
provided solid explanations yet, basically because of 
the contributions of economic and criminal sociology, 
the first studying a differential performance or 
territorial economies, the second studying the factors 
motivating economic crimes. An analytical thematic 
subject above the enterprise victimization has not been 
found as a consequence of these different streams. The 
result is that we have a sterile list of practical facts 
which has been gathered without any analytical 
improvement.  
Probably, this is due to a misrepresentation of the 
way the market operates or of the relationship between 
economics and society, not stressing enough that, as it 
is now widely acknowledged in the economic rational 
approach (Coleman 1990; Hechter and Kanazawa 
1997), formal institutions and other complex social 
structures evolve responding to rules and sanctions, to 
positive and negative incentives (Barbera and Negri 
2008; Coleman 2005; Hechter and Kanazawa 1997). 
In order to prevent the birth of the interpretative 
dichotomous model of the homo economicus opposed 
to homo sociologicus.  
Phenomena are economically relevant not so much 
for their intrinsic economic significance but for the 
economic effects they generate. Access to bank credit, 
for example, is a typical economic action based on 
rational assumptions of utility maximization that has 
effects on the economic development of an area.  
In order to optimise his behaviour, any 
entrepreneur does not disdain interpersonal contacts, 
and evaluate the cost conditions and the collateral 
required by the bank or the certainty of the loan. On 
its side, the financial intermediary is active in 
monitoring the economic agents, their selection, even 
considering the social reputation of the debtor. In such 
a situation, a positive match between demand for and 
supply of credit depends not only on the maximization 
of the objective function of each individual agent, but 
also on a wider number of structural factors or “social 
capital” that encourage the agents to favour certain 
strategies. This is the case of a widespread recourse to 
informal lending and/or social networks when the 
formal process of credit is unavailable, insufficient or 
beset with complicated procedures.  
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Social and customer relations are fundamental 
assets for the understanding of the mechanisms that 
facilitate the access-to-credit, and such a relationship 
is crucial for explaining why some regions suffer poor 
economic conditions and are less developed than 
others. 
In Italy, for instance, Southern regions are less 
developed than the ones in the North of Italy and this 
is partly due to the fact that in the South of Italy credit 
conditions are more severe, since financial 
intermediaries ask for higher interest rates or 
collaterals. This undermines the prospects of 
economic growth and exerts a negative effect on 
firms’ investment decisions, conditioning their 
businesses unless they can rely on alternative sources 
of credit. 
Due to poor institutions and insufficient social 
capital accumulation, financial intermediaries select 
their customers not on the basis of economic variables 
but on the basis of the quality of the customer 
relationship. These relationship are usually permeated 
by “informal” or amiable properties and by the logic 
of social exchange that transforms customer 
relationship into a dimension of social relation similar 
to a bonding-type social capital, whose relevance is 
inversely related to the size of credit firms.  
In some pathological circumstances, these 
relationships might expose an entrepreneur to the risk 
of victimization since, as it will be argued in the next 
paragraph, difficulties in the access-to-credit can 
confine the firm to informal credit markets or even to 
credit markets controlled by mafia-type criminal 
organizations1 (Masciandaro 2001; Pinotti 2010; 
Camera dei Deputati 2011; Bonaccorsi di Patti 2009). 
What kind of explanation can sociological 
perspective suggest for these relational performance 
and paradoxes that are recorded in the local 
environment to the point total to catch conditions of 
victimization of the entrepreneur? That is, what is the 
form of social relations that predominates and what 
results it arouse both as a product (the greater burden 
of access-to-credit for entrepreneurs) and as an impact 
on the territorial community (favors the climate of 
uncertainty, the deterioration of the economic fabric, 
the weakening of the development)? 
From the sociological point of view among the 
latest theoretical developments that are targeted 
toward the exceedance of the dichotomy 
structure/agency, there is a relational perspective that 
moving its first steps from the 1980s in Italy, has been 
spreading beyond these borders offering an 
interpretive model of the relationship between 
individual-society that goes beyond dichotomous 
prospect and conceives the society “making”.  
The relational approach looks at the essence of the 
society, to form social relationships whose forms give 
rise to what we call society: in short, it conceives the 
social relationship as a “social molecule” and then 
starting it observes the ways in which changes 
continuously (morphogenetic aspect) or forms stable 
structure (morphostatic aspect) (Donati 1983, 1991, 
2006, 2010, 2011, 2013). The relational paradigm, 
which over time has been enriched by an 
epistemological, methodological base of thumb 
(Donati and Terenzi 2006; Donati and Colozzi 2006), 
neither keeps, then, the result of social interactions 
(e.g., social structures, institutions, organisations, etc.), 
nor looks at the intent of the act, the course of an 
individual’s action, but considers the society as a 
condition for explicit actions (it is constraint and a 
resource for agents). The social relation, in this 
analytical framework, is not conceived as a bridge 
between the individual and the system, or as a mix of 
individual and systemic elements, but as an emergent 
effect of interactions between action and social system: 
these are “reality with their properties and powers”.  
The social relation itself (as a concept) is 
decomposable inside (because it is reticular and 
multidimensional) and can be recomposed as an 
emergent effect precisely because it assumes a certain 
configuration in the growing network of relationships 
(to create goods, to gain an interest, to realize a 
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connection) in a given contingency (Archer 1995, 
2003). Morphogenesis and morphostasis are those 
which best fit to the social relations. The results of 
such processes can be different. It’s in fact the quality 
of the relation that produces specific features marking 
the phenomena. Observing a social fact (in this case, 
the connection between risk of victimization and 
difficulties of access to credit) means, then, looking at 
the interaction between two autonomous spheres (the 
process of victimization to stakeholders and the 
organization mode of credit) and explains (identifies) 
what effect emerges, i.e., what is the identity that 
takes the relationship between entrepreneur and credit 
company (communicative interaction) and following 
up with the kind of relationship understanding which 
new pattern is produced, so asking the lender could 
have an impact on the credit amount by the requiring 
company.  
In the context of empirical evidence, the data seem 
to suggest that the supply of credit, especially in the 
areas of the province of Naples, is addressed to 
customers whose selection takes place not according 
to variables of economic-financial performance 
(corporate budgets, sales growth prospects, propensity 
to export, investment, margin size, undertaking 
research and development costs, organizational 
innovations, product or process, etc.), but on 
expressive variables concerning the quality of the 
relationship established with the contractor. Plus the 
customer relationship is thickened by “informal” 
properties, communication, friendships and logic of 
social reciprocity specifies that curve the shape of the 
relationship with the contractor in that dimension of 
social relations which takes on the character of social 
bonding type capital, it maintains the same 
relationship. The banking company’s size is limited 
(and territorially device) to a greater extent the 
customer relationship takes on this quality.  
In the conceptual frame of the relational paradigm, 
the communicative interaction between entrepreneur 
and credit company can be explaine by observing the 
binding type. The communicative relationship among 
the different players creates an energy which helps 
only those who shares the same relational identity, so 
to have selective effects, not just because the person 
who receives is the object of universal credit strategy, 
but giving a meaning to the relationship which is 
created.  
In short, while from the point of view of the credit 
company it is expected to produce a communicative 
interaction organized customer oriented purposely to 
achieve objectives (formal relations in systemic sense 
described by Habermas), in fact access-to-credit based 
on those subjects that build (using their informational 
stock) a mutually shared sense orientation for which 
the (quality of) relation has hallmarks from the assets 
over functional and formal economic organizations 
request.  
The paradox that occurs in the context of the city 
where most prevalent is the presence of large banks is 
that the sharp contraction in supply of credit to 
businesses is affected by a limited importance given to 
customer relationships, self-laid more by 
informational elements that improve the objective 
function of the banking company (paying some of the 
credit granted) and expansion strategies of the offer of 
products. The weak political strategic focus on credit 
penalizes employers who extend their gaze on other 
credit sources. The town is markedly more negative 
with respect to the province where the customer 
selection takes place, however, on the basis of the 
identity of the report definition that seems to reward 
more stakeholders. 
The difficulty of access-to-credit exposes 
entrepreneurs, as they try, to the risk of victimization, 
temporary state illiquidity or recourse to sources 
outside the banking system, until the closure of their 
companies. Additionally, it must be considered that 
South of Italy has bank credit more chronically 
rationed compared to the rest of Italy. If one adds to 
this that the continuing economic crisis since 2008 has 
made the most critical business financing (Albareto 
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and Finaldi Russo 2012), you can understand what 
impact takes on the dynamics of the economic 
difficulties of access-to-credit. However, even though 
data processing is not a linear correlation registered 
with this factor, interviews indicate that exposure to 
credit loan shark and the conditioning of criminal 
organizations on the life of the enterprise appear 
relevant.  
RELATIONSHIP BANKING AND THE 
LOCK­IN PHENOMENON   
The modern literature on financial intermediation has 
primarily focused on the role of banks as relationship 
lenders. Banks develop close relationships with 
borrowers over time. Such proximity between the 
bank and the borrower has been shown to facilitate 
monitoring and screening of the borrowers and can 
overcome problems of asymmetric information.  
Despite a huge literature on the relationship 
between banks and borrowers (Hodgman 1961; Kane 
and Malkiel 1965; Wood 1975), there is not any clear 
definition of “relationship banking”. Hodgman (1961) 
maintained that banks might induce some of their 
customers to keep their deposits with them, and not 
with competing banks, offering higher interest rates. 
Kane and Malkiel (1965) emphasized the gain in 
information that allowed each bank to select the best 
customers (those demanding for more deposits on a 
longer time span) to whom they can lend at lower 
interest rates. Wood (1975) stressed the role that the 
relationship might play in defining a strategy to 
compete with the other banks on the lending market: 
first, the bank can acquire more customers offering 
loans at very low prices; once the relationship has 
been established, then the bank can increase the 
lending rates. On the whole, however, all these 
contributions consider the “relationship banking” as a 
competitive strategy to increase their market share on 
the loans and/or the deposit market.  
More recently, the same concept has been 
considered within the asymmetric information 
literature and it has been used to justify the existence 
of banks as source of loanable funds in alternative to 
(bond) markets. This kind of literature stems from the 
theoretical contributions by Leland and Pyle (1977), 
Diamond (1984) and Fama (1985) on the differences 
between commercial banks and the other financial 
intermediaries.  
Traditionally, commercial banks hold illiquid 
assets that are funded largely with bank deposits, and 
that might be often withdrawn on demand with little 
uncertainty about their value. By liquidating claims, 
banks may facilitate the funding of projects that would 
otherwise be infeasible. Greenbaum and Thakor (1995) 
maintained that banks managed and absorbed credit 
and liquidity risks by issuing claim on its total assets 
with different characteristics from those encountered 
in its loan portfolio. As for the banks’ assets, they are 
illiquid mostly because of their information sensitivity. 
In pricing loans, banks develop proprietary 
information that is further exploited through 
subsequent monitoring of the borrower. It is this 
proprietary information that actually makes these 
loans a non-marketable asset, thus providing the most 
fundamental explanation for the existence of banks as 
financial intermediaries (Bhattacharya and Thakor 
1993).  
Thanks to the client relationships, the bank can 
acquire private information on each borrower thus 
reducing the informational asymmetries that make the 
access-to-credit markets very difficult for the opaque 
entrepreneurs (Bhattacharya and Thakor 1993). 
According to this view, the relationship between 
customers and their bank is antithetic to the one with 
the markets, and in fact these contributions have 
mostly been developed in USA and UK, that is, in 
countries where financial and credit markets are well 
established and the question of the benefits that might 
derive from the bank lending is a crucial one, since 
usually the resources collected by bank are more 
costly with respect to the ones collected into the 
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market.  
Further developments consider the “relationship 
banking” as one modality in which each bank can 
model its organization. When the relationship is 
lasting for a long period through multiple interactions 
with the same customer over time and/or across 
products, the bank can acquire borrower 
specific—often proprietary—information available 
only to the intermediary and the customer. This 
information can be obtained when banks provide 
screening (Ramakrishnan and Thakor 1984) or 
monitoring services (Winton 1995) and allow banks to 
gather information beyond readily available public 
information thus spreading their collection costs onto 
a broader range of products or along a longer period of 
time. On the basis of this private information, the 
intermediary can device the optimal contract and 
make the access-to-credit more easy, either granting a 
loan even to borrowers that otherwise would be faced 
with serious financial constraint in the market for 
funds, or lending a larger quantity of credit at a lower 
interest rates or even asking for a smaller amount of 
collateral (Boot and Thakor 2000).  
With respect to the type and quality of information, 
they are mostly qualitative and borrower-specific (e.g., 
entrepreneur’s ability, her ethic profile, etc.), a sort of 
“soft” information that goes beyond the information 
conveyed by “hard” elements such as the firm’s 
financial statements, its collateral and credit score, 
thus helping the financial intermediary deal with 
informational opacity problems better than any 
potential transactions lender (Udell 2002; Petersen 
2004).  
Several studies have also argued on empirical 
grounds that the “relationship banking” is more 
successful when the dimension of the financial 
intermediary is not very large, so that those who 
collect the “soft” information are the same who decide 
whether to extend credit to the firm, and the bank is 
very proximate to the firm: when this is the case, the 
financial intermediary is then more efficient in 
screening firms with relevant informational opacity, as 
in the case of small and micro enterprises (Angelini, 
Di Salvo, and Ferri 1998; Alessandrini et al. 2009). 
To this extent, one motive of concern is in the 
consolidation process observed in the financial 
systems, where most financial intermediaries are 
increasing their dimension through merging and 
acquisitions with other competitors, since this 
tendency might cause a credit constraint that to a 
larger extent will be suffered by the less transparent 
firms (Bonaccorsi di Patti and Gobbi 2001; Sapienza 
2002). These firms might be thrown out of the market 
or induced to raise borrowing funds in less transparent 
ways through informal or even criminal markets.  
A second motive of concern is the “hold-up” 
problem that has to do with the information monopoly 
that the bank acquires in the course of lending. The 
threat of being informationally captured (“locked in”) 
by the bank is closely inversely-related to the 
possibility for each firm to establish multiple bank 
relationships (Ongena and Smith 2000). 
Whenever a firm is “locked in”, it might observe a 
deteriorations in the credit conditions or a reduction in 
the amount of products offered over the time. But it 
could also be exposed to requests from the financial 
intermediary that might also have some criminal 
profile, as in the case of Parmalat vs. Capitalia.  
Parmalat is a multinational Italian dairy and food 
corporation, a leading global company in the 
production of UHT (ultra-high temperature) milk, 
which went bankrupted in 2003 with a 14 billion Euro 
default (Di Staso 2004).  
By the mid of 1990s, Parmalat financed several 
international acquisitions. However, since 2001 many 
of the new divisions were producing losses, and the 
company financing largely relied upon the use of 
derivatives, with the intention of hiding the extent of 
its losses and debt.  
At that time, Parmalat had Capitalia, a leading 
Italian commercial banking that has then been merged 
into Unicredit, as its primary source of borrowing 
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financing. A criminal investigation run by the Procura 
of Parma and the Procura of Milano has revealed that 
Mr. Geronzi, the CEO of Capitalia, forced Mr. Tanzi, 
the CEO of Parmalat, to acquire the Eurolat company 
for the amount of nearly 400 million Euro, an amount 
larger than the market value of Eurolat. Most of this 
amount went to repay the debt that Eurolat had with 
Capitalia. As the criminal investigation has assessed, 
in 2002 Mr. Tanzi was asked for acquiring Eurolat in 
order to have granted from Capitalia a “bridge” loan 
of 50 million Euro which was needed to recover the 
losses of Parmatour, a division of Parmalat. In 2011 
Mr. Geronzi was fined with a 5-year penalty.  
THE DATASET AND THE EMPIRICAL 
RESULTS   
The relationship between victimization and 
access-to-credit have been investigated using an 
original dataset with information collected through a 
victimization survey administered to entrepreneurs in 
Campania associated with UNINDUSTRIA2. 
The entrepreneurs were asked questions on their 
characteristics (e.g., age, sex, level of education) and 
those of their firm (e.g., geographical location, 
industrial sector, number of employees, employment 
dynamics, origin of the firm). They have also been 
asked on their experience in the access-to-credit, 
whether they ever experienced any difficulty and how 
they solved the problem, and whether they have ever 
been victims of crimes both related and unrelated to 
their professional activity.  
Most of the entrepreneurs have their firms located 
in the province of Naples (53%) and Caserta (29%), 
the two provinces in Campania where mafia-type 
organizations are most active. A large part of the firms 
are in the engineering (24%) and the textile (11%) 
industry, and nearly 40% of them have less than 20 
employees.   
In 46% of the cases, the set-up of the firm was 
funded with personal capital, while nearly 15% with 
bank credit or credit facilities and 30% were inherited. 
Difficulties in accessing credit were experienced by 
63% of the entrepreneurs, and these have been 
circumvented offering personal guarantees (54%) or 
receiving funds from relatives and friends (32%).  
Among all the available variables, the ones that 
have been selected to explain victimization rates are 
the following: difficulties in accessing credit, province 
where the firm is located, number of employees, 
employment dynamics, age and level of education of 
the entrepreneur, and origin of the firm (more details 
in Table 1).  
These variables were used as predictors of three 
selected victimization rates (theft, robbery, imposition 
of employment or suppliers) in a logistic equation and 
the empirical results are shown in Table 2.  
The results show that robbery and theft 
victimization rates are exclusively determined by two 
variables: the province where the firm is located and 
the number of employees. In particular, if the firm is 
located in Naples or if the firm has no more than 5 
employees, then the chances for the entrepreneur to be 
victimized are higher. None of the other covariates 
relating either to the characteristic of the firm or to 
entrepreneur’s profile are significant.  
This evidence is not unexpected, since the types of 
crime under investigation are not strictly related with 
the entrepreneurs’ activity; what matter are 
background factors, as the geographical location or the 
dimension of the firm, since micro-firms are more 
likely clustered around the city of Naples, where 
victimizations rates as such are higher than in the rest 
of the region.  
When a different crime more related to 
entrepreneurs’ activity is considered, then the picture 
is remarkably different. Victimization rates related to 
the imposition of employment or supplier are also 
determined by the dynamics of the employment and 
the origin of the firm, besides the background factors. 
When the number of employees has increased in  
the previous three years, the likelihood of being 
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Table 1. The Data‐Set 
Variable     
Access‐to‐credit  1 = difficulties (always or sometimes)  0 = never experienced any difficulty 
Prov_NA  1 = firm is located in the province of Naples 
0 = firm is located in one of the remaining four 
provinces in Campania 
Micro‐firm  1 = no. employees ≤ 5  0 = no. employees > 5 
Employment dynamics  1 = no. of employees has increased in the previous three years 
0 = no. of employees has not increased (stable 
or decreased) 
Age  1 = <50 yrs old  0 = otherwise 
Education  1 = Diploma or Laurea  0 = otherwise 
Origin of the Firm_1 
Origin of the Firm_2 
Origin of the Firm_3 
1 = Personal capital 
2 = Bank Credit/Credit Facilities 
3 = Foreign/Other 
0 = inherited 
 
Table 2. Empirical Results   
Odds‐Ratio  Robbery  Theft  Imposition of employment/suppliers 
Access‐to‐credit  .80  .66  1.31** 
Prov_NA  12.20***  7.35***  8.60*** 
Microfirm  1.11*  2.77**  5.50** 
Employment dynamics  .95  .84*  .43** 
Age  .88  .94  .85 
Education  .73  .69  .81 
Origin of the Firm_1  1.20  1.08  .83 
Origin of the Firm_2  .79  .81  1.11** 
Origin of the Firm_3  .33  .72  .22*** 
Constant  Yes  Yes  Yes 
F‐test Origin of Firm (p‐value)  .251  .153  .039 
Goodness of Fit (p‐value)  .094  .043  .002 
% cases correctly classified  58%  66%  73% 
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; Yes = The models are estimated with a constant.   
 
victimized is smaller: dynamic firms are less 
vulnerable to some forms of imposition onto their 
activities. As for the origin of the firm, when the firm 
was set up with funds from bank credit or credit 
facilities then the odds for the entrepreneur of being 
victim of some imposition is higher than for those 
who inherited their firm; the opposite for those who 
run a firm originally financed with foreign capital: 
they experience smaller probability of being 
victimized than those who inherited their firm. As a 
whole, the variables “origin of the firm” are 
significant at a significant level of 4% or higher.  
Furthermore, for this type of crime the variable 
access-to-credit turns out be significant: those who 
experienced difficulties in accessing credit have a 
greater probability of being victims of some 
imposition in the choice of their suppliers or in the 
decisions on the number and type of employees. This 
evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that, in 
presence of difficulties in accessing credit, the 
entrepreneur might solve the problem either 
establishing a close relationship with a single bank, 
being “locked-in”, or going to the informal credit 
market. In both cases the entrepreneur is vulnerable to 
Sociology  Study  3(10) 
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some victimization.  
CONCLUSIONS   
Access-to-credit is a key factor in the economic 
development of a region and its diffusion is based not 
just on economic considerations but also on a close 
customer relationship between entrepreneurs and 
financial intermediaries, especially in presence of poor 
institutions and low social capital accumulation. 
In some pathological circumstances, when the 
financial intermediary acquires a relevant information 
monopoly due to the close customer relationship, a 
firm might be locked-in, thus observing a 
deterioration in the credit conditions or a reduction in 
the amount of credit supplied that exposes the firm to 
unlawful pressure from opaque intermediaries or 
requests from banks that might also have some 
criminal profile. 
According to the original dataset collected through 
a victimization survey among entrepreneurs in the 
largest region of the South of Italy, there is a 
significant evidence that corroborates the hypothesis 
that entrepreneurs experiencing difficulties in 
access-to-credit are vulnerable to some forms of 
victimization, especially when this refers to crimes 
more related to entrepreneurs’ activity. 
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Notes 
1. Several studies have shown that during the last 30 years, and 
particularly in the provinces of Naples and Caserta in 
Campania, criminal organizations have entered in a 
pervasive manner the industrial system, altering the 
functioning of market rules and increasing economic and 
financial vulnerability of the region Campania, with 
significant side effects also on credit to firms.  
2. Campania is the largest region in the South of Italy, ranking 
second for the number of population and first for the 
density of population among all the Italian regions; 
UNINDUSTRIA is the most important Italian association 
of entrepreneurs with branches in each single Italian region; 
the survey was conducted in 2007 and the questionnaire 
was made available on a password-protected page of 
UNINDUSTRIA website; the cases collected were 150 out 
of nearly 2,500 potentially responses.  
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